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48TH CoNGRESS, l HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
lst Session.
_(

REPORT
{ No.1663.

FORFEITED GRANTS ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY.

MAY

28, 1884.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. CoBB, from the Uommittee on the Public Lands, submitted the
following

REPORT:
[To accompany bill H. R. 7162.]

The Committee on the Public Lands, to whom were referred sundry bills for
the forfeitm·e of the land grant to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad
Company, submit the following report:
The grant made to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company is,
according to the estimate made by the company, the largest land-grant
ever made to any corporation in this country, the estimated number of
acres being 49,244,803-an empire in extent.
The act making this great grant was approved July 27, 1866. (14
Stat. at Large, 292.) By this act the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad
Company was authorized and empowered to lay out and construct a
continuous railroad and telegraph line, beginning at the town of Springfield, in the State of Missouri; thence to the wes·t ern boundary-line of
said State, and thence, by the most eligible railroad route as should be
determined by said company, to a point on the Canadian River; thence
to the town of Albuquerque, on the river Del Norte, and thence, by way
of the Agua Frio, to the headwaters of the Colorado Chiquita; .thence,
along the thirty-fifth parallel, to the Colorado River, and thence to the
Pacific Ocean, with a branch diverging at a point where the main line
strikes the Canadian River, running eastwardly to a point on the western boundary-line of the State of Arkansas, at the town of Van Buren;
thus the main line passing through the Inuian Territory, Texas, New
Mexico, Arizona, and California, a distance of more than 2,000 miles.
The second section of said act grants to said company the right of
way over the public lands to the extent of 100 feet on each side of said
road, and an additional amount of land for depots, &c.
The third section provides "that there be and hereby is granted" to
said company, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of its road
and telegraph line, every alternate section of public land, not mineral,
designated by odd numbers, to the amount of twenty alternate sections
per mile on each side of said railroad line through the Territories of the
United States, and ten alternate sections per mile on each side of said railroad whenever it passes through any State. .And in case any lands
within this limit were disposed of by the Government, the company was
to have the right to select other lands in lieu thereof in alternate oddnumbered sections, not more than 10 miles beyond the limits of said
alternate sections, and not including the reserved numbers.
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The fourth section of said act provides that whenever said company
shall have 25 consecutive miles of any portion of said railroad and telegraph line ready for the service contemplated, the President of the
United States shall appoint three commissioners to examine the same,
and if it shall appear that the same has been completed in a good, substantial, and workmanlike manner the commissioners shall so report,
under oath, to the President of the United States, and patents of lands
shall be issued· to said railroad company confirming to said company
the right and title to said lands situate opposite to and coterminous
with said completed section of said road. And the same shall be done
as often as any 25 consecutive miles are completed.
The sixth section provides that the President of the United States
shall cause the lands to be surveyed for 40 miles in width on both sides
of the entire line of said road, after the general route shall be fixed, and
as fast as may be required by the construction of said . railroad; and
that the odd sections of ]and granted shall not be liable to sale or entry
or pre-emption before or ajte'i' they are surveyed, except by said company,
as provided by said act.
The eighth and ninth secti~ns set forth the principal conditions on
which Raid grant is made.
The twelfth section provides that the company shall accept the terms
and conditions of the grant within two years after the passage of the
act by depositing in the office of the Secretary of the Interior such acceptance in writing under the corporate seal of said company, duly
executed pursuant to the direction of its board of directors first had
and obtained.
These are the only sections of the act which need be referred to at
this time for the purposes of this report. Congress passed an act April
20, 1870, to enable the company to mortgage its road which will be considered further on.
The material facts are as follows :
The company accepted the grant by depositing in the Interior Department its acceptance in writing on the 27th day of November, 1866.
By the sixth section of said act., as has alre~dy been observed, it is
provided that the company shall fix the general route of its road, and
when this was done the President of the United States was to cause
the lands to be withdrawn. &c.
A map of the general ro'u te of said road was filed in the Interior Department December 17, 1866, from Springfield, in the State of Missouri,
to the west line of said State, and the public lands em braced within the
limits of said grant were withdrawn to the extent or coterminous with
this part of the located route.
It is a fact that should be observed, that no further map of the general
route was filed until December 2, 1871, more than five years after the
pasRage of the granting act. And the first map of definite location was
not filed in t,h e Interior Department until December 10, 1870, and that
extended only from Springfield to Neosho, in the State of Missouri, and
was filed more than four years after the date of the granting act, and
more than two years after the construction of said road was to have
been commenced, and after two years of the time had elapsed during
which it was required by the granting act to complete not less than 50
miles of its road each year. It is claimed by the company that the
construction of the road was commenced July 4, 1868. But the affidavits of the chief engineer, on file in the Interior Department, show
that the :first 25 miles of the road was not completed until September 27, 1870, being that portion of the road running west from Spring-
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field, in the State of Missouri. And only 125 miles of the road was completed within the time fixed for the completion of the whole of the main
line, leaving unfinished more than 2,000 miles; thus showing that if
the construction of the road was commenced on July 4, 1868, it was only
done for ihe purpose of a technical compliance with that condition, as
no substantial part of the road, as we have already shown, was cqmpleted until about September, 1870, thereby proving that the company
was guilty at the very beginning of two flagrant violations of the conditions of its contract with the Government, in not completing at least
50 miles each two years after the date when the work was to commence and not having completed the main line within the time fixed. The
125 miles was not completed until October 14, 1871. InNovember, 1870,
this company purchased from the Saint Louis and San Francisco Railway Company the latter's railroad running from a point near Saint
Louis to Springfield, in the State of Missouri. This was done under the
pretext of securing an eastern outlet. The price agreed to be paid was
$10,000,000, which was secured by mortgage on the property so purchased, and that part of the grantee's road together wit~he land grant
lying in the State of Missouri. A year after this purchase the company
became so much embarrassed financially that it stopped the further
construction of its road and afterwards made default in the payment of
interest on its said mortgage indebtedness. And the said mortgage was
foreclosed, and afterwards, on September 14,1876, the entire mortgaged
property waR sold to William F. Buckley, and by him conveyed, Novem.
ber 2, 1876, to the Saint Louis and 8an Francisco Railway Company..
Thus this latter company again became the owner of the property it
had sold and also that part of the road and land graut belonging to the
Atlantic and Pacific Company lying in the State of 1\fissouri, leaving
the latter company the owner of but 34 miles of completed road at the
date of said sale. And this is the only portion of said road the company built west of the western line of the State of Missouri. And this
is operated and controlled by the Saint Louis and San Francisco Railway Company. This latter company built during the last year 65 miles
of road over the line of the Atlantic and Pacific west from Vinita and
and is now operating the same. As has been stated the Atlantic and
Pacific company stopped the construction of its road in the year 1871
and no more of its road was completed until November, 1882, more than
eleven years after it had suspended work and more than four years after
the time when the main line should have been completed by the terms
of the granting act. And said company was utterly powerless to complete any further portion of its road when the Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe and the Saint Louis and San Francisco Railroad companies
for the purpose of being able to completely control the Atlantic and
Pacific Company and its imperial land grant, and to ultimately become
the owner of all its property, entered into a contract with the latter
company for the completion of that part of said road from Albuquerque,
N. Mex., to the Atlantic Ocean, known and designated as the western
division. This tripartite agreement was entered into January 31, 1880,
and provided for the immediate completion of the said western division.
To provide the money necessary for this construction, early in 1880,
a first mortgage, to secure an issue of bonds not exceeding $25,000 per
mile, was placed upon the entire railroad, franchise, and land grant of
the Western Division; and an income mortgage to secure an issue of
income bonds, not exceeding $18,750 per mile upon this division, was
also executed. Should the net earnings of the Western Division prove
insufficient to meet the interest upon those first-mortgage uonds, the
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Saint Louis and San Francisco Railway Company and the Atchison,
Topeka, and Santa Fe Bailroad Company have guaranteed the same to
the extent of 25 per cent. of their gross earnings upon all business interchanged by them respectively with the said Western Division.
In -April, 1880, $10,000,000 of the first-mortgage bonds and $7,500,000
of the income bonds of this division were sold by subseription at par
for the first ·mOl tgage bonds to parties holding nghts under the agreement. A second subscription of $15,000,000 firsts and $11,250,000 incomes of the Western Division was offered the same parties by circular
dated January 20, 1882, and promptly subscribed in full; but before
allotment all subscriptions were reduced by the board of directors February 2S, 1882, to40percent. of theoriginalamount-thatis, to$6,000,000
:firsts and $4,500,000 incomes, in accordance with the right reserved by
the terms of the Rubscription.
Should the net proceeds of these subscriptions prove to be insufficient
to complete the road, andpaythe interest upon the first-mortgage bonds
during construction, arrangements have been made with the Atchison,
Topeka and S~nta Fe Railroad Company and the Saint Louis and San
Francisco Railway Company, which own neaJ;ly all the capital stock of
this company, to advance any deficit, share and share alike, in the form
of a loan, to be repaid hereafter.
And a first mortgage was also executed on the 1st day of March, 1882,
on that portion of the road between the west line of the State of Missouri, near Seneca, to the town of Albuquerque on the Rio Grande River,
in the Territory of New Mexico, called the Central Division, to secure
the payment of bonds to the amount of $25,000 per mile for that part
of the road.
These bonds were all taken, and are now owned by the parties interested in the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe and the Saint Louis and
San Francisco companies, and the capital stock is now owned by these
two companies; and the Atlantic and Pacific Road, and all the property, rights, and franchises of the company, are virtually owned and controlled by these two corporations. They hold the mortgage interests
complete, all of the road which is completed, and operate it after it is so
completed. vVe believe that the tripartite agreement above referred to
was entered into with a full understanding by all the parties that the
.Atlantic and Pacific was to maintain a nominal existence merely so as
to enable these two corporations to secure the benefit of the land grant
to the extent they desire under the act passed by Uongress April 21,
1871, to enable the Atlantic and Pacific Company to mortgage its road.
They caused the murtgages named to be executed, and the bonds to be
issued, for the individuals composing these two companies owned the
capital stock of the .Atlantic and Pacific Company, thus giving them
complete control of t.he latter company. They bought the bonds so
issued, and now own them, and these corporations guaranteed their payment. They are, therefore, both debtor and creditor in this transaction .
.And they are now only completing such parts of said road as suits their
selfish desires, in securing such parts of the land grant as may be coterminous therewith at the date of the declaration of forfeiture by the
Government. Since entering into this tripartite agreement they have
completed 559 miles of the Western Division, extending west from Isleta
Junction on the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad to the Colorado River, near the Needles. .At this latter point connection is formed
with the Southern Pacific Railroad, and running arrangements have
been entered into with the latter road, extending to the city of San
Francisco. Whether the road will ever be completed west of its present
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terminus we do not know. But we do know that the lands have been
withdrawn for more than fourteen years from homestead pre-emption
and entry the whole length of the road, and even beyond what was
contemplated by the granting act. The act required the company to
construct its road on the most practicable and eligible route along the
thirty-fifth parallel of north latitude to the Pacific Ocean. This fixed
the western terminus of the road, as we believe, at or near the point
where the thirty-fifth parallel intersects the Pacific Ocean. But im,tead
of filing its map of definite location, in accord with this, when it crossed
the east line of the State of California, it left the t,hirty-fifth parallel and
passed up the Pacific coast, and terminated the location near the thirtyeighth parallel of north latitude at the city of San Francisco; and
strange as it may seem to some, the Assistant Attorney-General of the
United States, W. H. Smith, sustained the right of the company to do
so in a written opinion delivered March 16, 187 4, which was confirmed
by the then Secretary of the Interior, C. Delano . . Secretary Cox, a
former Secretary, denied the company thi~:_; right in a written opinion to
the Commissioner of the General Land Office, delivered on November
11, 1869. He said:
I cannot recognize the claim of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company to a reservation of lands npon the route in question. The act already cited (July 27, 1866),
npon which they rely, does not, as I construe it, make them a grant of lands from the
point at which the road shall strike tho Colorado River to San Francisco.

We concur in the opinion of Secretary Cox. He is a gentleman of
high legal attainmentH, and was au honest and faithful officer. But his
opinion was overruled, as we have shown, and a vast area of public land
was added to this already magnificent grant. The amount of land withdrawn in the State of OaJifornia, on account of this grant amounts to
6,855,040 acres, embracing some of the most valuable lands in the State.
And a sumrnarv of these facts shows:
1st. That the Atlantic and Pacific Company never completed but 34
miles of the road which it now claims to own.
2d. That at the time when the main line should have been. completed
(July 4, 187.,), there was uncompleted 2,267 miles of that line.
3d. That said company at no time since its creation has been, and is
not now, able to complete the road.
4th. That the stockholders of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
and the Saint Louis and San Francisco Railroad companies own most
of its capital stock.
5th. That these corporations caused the mortgages to be executed on
the franchises, rights, and property, including the land grant, and caused
the bonds to be issued and guaranteed their payment, and took the bonds
when so issued and now hold them.
6th. That they virtually own and control t,h e Atlantic and Pacific
Company and all its property, together with its mortgage and bonded
indebtedness; and are holding them and allowing the company to
maintain a mere nominal existence.
We have now given a brief history of the facts connected with this
grant fro~ its beginning to the present time, passing over a period of
nearly eighteen years and extending nearly eight yea1·s beyond the time
when the main line should have been completed to enable them to control the land grant at pleasure under their construction of the law.
The rules of' law governing this grant are similar to those governing
other grants heretofore reported by your committee.
The granting act in its main features is almost an exact copy of the
act making the grant to the N ortbern Pacific Company, and what we
said in that case is also applicable in this.
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The third section of the act contains the following language:
That there be, and hereby is, granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Com·
pany * * * every alternate section of public lands not mineral designated by odd
numbers, &c.

The eighth and ninth sections read as follows :
SEC. 8. And be it ju1·ther enacted, That each and every grant, right, and privilege
herein are so made and given to and accepted by said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad
Company, upon and subject to the followmg conditions, namely: That the said company shall commence the work on said road within two years from the approval of
this act by the President, and shall complete not less than fi.ft.y miles per year after
the second year, and shall construct, equip, furnish, and complete the main line of
the whole road by the fourth day of July, anno Domini eighteen hundred and seventyeight.
SEC. 9. And be it ju1·ther enacted, That the United States make the several conditional grants herein, and that the said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company accept
the same, upon the further condition that if the said company make any breach of the
conditions hereof, and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year, then, in
such case, at any time hereafter, the United States may do any and all acts and things
which may be needful and necessary to insure a speedy completion of the said road.

Whatever may have been the earlier rulings upon the subject, it is
clear that under the third, eighth, and ninth sections just quoted the
.Atlantic and Pacific Company took at the date of the act an estate in
presenti upon conditions subsequent. (Rutherford vs. Green's heirs, 2
Wheat; Louissen vs. Price, 12 Howard, 59; Schulenberg vs. Harriman, 21
Wall., 149;. VanWyck vs. Knevals, 16 Otto; Opinion of Attorney-General Devens, 16; Opinion .Attorney-General Brewster, Ex. Doc. 31, 1st
sess. 48th Congress; Leavenworth, &c., R. R. Co. vs. U. S., 92 U.S.
Reports, 741.)
This being a grant in presenti, vesting the title of the lands described
in the grant in the company as we have shown, the question arises
bow that title can be divested. In the case of Schulenberg vs. Harriman,
above cited, it is held that it requires an act of Congress declaring a
forfeiture in order to divest the company of the title. .As the law now
stands Congress must take the initiative by either declaring a forfeiture
by direct enactment to that effect, or it must pass a law conferring jurisdiction on the courts. In other words, it seems that under the opinion
in the case of Schulenberg vs. Harriman, that Congress has the exclusive
jurisdiction to declare a forfeiture. It is held in the case of Farnsworth
vs. Minnesota and Pacific Ra,ilroad Company, 92 U. S., page 66, thatA forfeiture by the State of an interest in lands and connected franchises, granted
for the construction of a public work, may be declared for non-compliance with the
conditions annexed to their grant or their possession, when forfeiture is provided by
statute, without judicial proceedings to ascertain and determine the failure of the
grantee to perform the conditions.

Confirming the rule laid down in the above-cited cases.
Your committee have uniformly held that Congress possesses the
power to declare these grants forfeited. and have reported several bills
for that purpose, two of which have already passed the House. And
we may state, also, that of all the learned counsel who have appeared
before us none of them have taken issue with the law as we have just
stated it. They all agree that Congress has jurisdiction to declare a
forfeiture in all such cases.
The question rests upon a construction of sections 3, 8, and 9. The
.attorneys for the company claim that they constitute an absolute dedication of the lands to the purpose of construction and maintenance of
the road. They contend that there is no condition subsequent what.ever, and that the only power in the United States is the power through
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Congress to adopt such measures as may be necessary to insure ~
.speedy completion of the road in case the company fails to build it.
The third, fifth, eighth, and ninth sections of the act we are here considering are in substance the same as the like numbered sections in the
Northern Pacific grant; and what your committee said in the report
made by J ndge Henley to the House at the present session in that case
ris equally applicable in this, therefore we adopt it, as follows:
On the other hand, your committee regard this construction as utterly untenable,
are clearly of the opinion!. That section 8 of the act declares a condition subsequent, viz, that the road shall
be completed within a certain time, upon hreach of which the grantor may declare a
forfeiture.
·
2. That section 9 is in no way repugnant to section 8, but while embracing all that
1s included therein, and to that extent perhaps cumulative, is also, in connection with
-section 5, a declaration of further and additional conditions subsequent, for breach of
which Congress may interfere to protect the rights of the United States.
3. Tha.t under either of said sections, or both to(J'ether, the United States, by Congress, has the rtght to declare t.he grant forfeited fur failure to build the road within
the limitation.
~nd

I.
Section 8 is perfectly plain in the language used and the purpose contemplated. It
-declares in so many words that the grant made is given by the United States and ac·cepted by the company "subject to the following conditions, namely, that the said company * * * shall construct, equip, furnish, and complete the whole road," &c.
Yfhis is too plain for any construction. Congress intended to provide, and did provide, that the road should be completed within a certain time, and that that should be a
.condition of the grant. If a condition, the grant is determinable upon its breach, at
the option of the grantor.
The argument of the company rests upon the absence of express works declaring
.a reversion iu case of the breach. That, in the judgment of your committee, was entirely unnecessary in order to create an estate upon condition subsequent. The estate,
'SO conditioned, is created by declaring the condition, not by declaring the result of its
breach. The latter, re-entry or its equivalent, follows as matter of legal effect. Every
lawyer knows the result of a breach of condition subsequent, and the statement of
that result in any grant adds nothing to the previous description of the estate created.
The laud does "revert" by operation of law upon the breach being enforced by re-entry or its equivalent ; but the right to that re-entry depends upon no express provision that the laud shall revert. It stands upon the condition declared and its breach.
Upon this point we quote from the report of the Public Lands Committee, made at
this session of Congress upon the bill forfeiting the Texas Pacific land grant, reported
to the House by Judge Payson :
"In other words, generally stated, the distinguished counsel for the company declares that in law the power to declare a forfeiture of a grant made on condition sub:sequent for breach of the condition must be reserved to the grantor by express terms
in the act making the grant, or it does not exist.
"No authority was produced to the committee except the statement of the attorneys
.asserting this extraordinary doctrine in support of it; but the interests being so great,
we have examined the books on the question, and are not able to find a single authority iu support of the proposition, and we believe none can be found.
''On the contrary, Washburn on Real Property, vol. 2, 3d ed., p. 15, asserts the rule
to be, "Where the condition of a grant is express there is no need of reserving a right
<>f entry for a breach thereof in order to enable the grantor to avail himself of it."
.(See also Jackson vs. Allen, :3 Cowan, 220; Gray t•s. Blanchard, 8 Pick., 284; Littleton,
sec. 311.)
"Indeed, all the decided cases we can find, as well as the text-books, are in harmony
and to the same effect; so we do not present argument upon it here."
The estate is created by proper words of description declaring the condition, and
the legal effect of what follows the breach is exactly the same whether it be described
J.n the grant or not. Thus in the case under consideration the estate upon condition
is created by the specific language used. The legal effect of reversion follows the
breach and declaration of forfeiture. No provision that the land should revert was
necessary, and if added would simply have described the legal result of what pre.ceded it.
The Touchstone, page 122, thus describes the operative words creating an estate
<>n condition:
"Conditions annexecl to estates are sometimes so placed and confounded among
.covenants, sometimes so ambiguously drawn, and at all times have in their drawing·
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so much affinity with limitations, that it is hard to discern and distinguish them.
}{pow therefore, for the most part, conditions have conditional words in their frontispiece, and do begin therewith, and that among these words there are three words that
are most proper, which in their own nature and efficacy, without any addit-ion of other
wo1·ds of re-entry in the conclltsion of the condition, do make the estate conditional, as.
p1·oviso, ita quod, and sub conditione."
Washburn in his work on Real Property, marginal page 445, says:
''Among the forms of expression, which imply a condition in a grant, the writers
give the following: 'On condition,'' provided always,' 'if it shall so happen,' or, 'so
that the grantee pay, &c., within a specified time,' and grants made upon any of
these terms vest a conditional estate in the grantee."
When the condition of a gra.nt is express, there is no necessity of reserving a right
of entry for breach of the condition, in order to enable the grantor to take advantageof lt. (Jackson vs. Allen, 3 Cow., ~20; Gray vs. Blanchard, 8 Pick., 21:!4.)
That the words "upon condition," and even words less specifically expressing theintent, are construed as establishing an estate upon condition subsequent, without
further description, is shown by many authorities. (Littleton, pp. 328, 329, 330, Com.
Dig. CondWon A 2; 2 Wood, Com. Powell's ed., 505, 512, et seq. j Wheeler vs. Walker,.
2 Conn., 201; Thomas V8. Record, 477 Me., 500; Sharon Iron Co. vs. Erin, 41 Penn.
St., 341; Ta~7 lor vs. Cedar Rapid R. R. Co., 25 Iowa, 371; Attorney-General VB. Merrimack Co., 14 Gray, 612; Tiadley vB. Hadley, 4 Gra.y, 145; Rawsol}. VB. School District,
7 Allen, 128; Caw vs. Robertson, 1 Selden, 125; Pickle VB. McKissick, 21 Penn. St.,.
232; Hooper vs. Cummings, 45 Me., 359; Chapin vs. School, 35 N.H., 450; Wiggin VB.
Berry, 2 Foster, 114; Hayden vs. Stoughton, 5 Pick., 534; Wright vs. Tuttle, 4 Day,.
326.)
Authorities upon this point might be multiplied. It is the construction of principle and authority, and your committee have been referreu to no case which in their
judgment militates at all against the positjon here assumed. The Touchstone, at
page 122, immediately followin~ the quotation which we have made, is suggested as
modifying the authority of the citation in its applicabilit,y to the case under consideration. But no such effect can possibly be given the language used. After stating the broad proposition quoted, the writer proceeds to say that although the words
mentioned are "the most proper words to make conditions," yet that they are sometimes used for other purposes. He then points out instances where the word'' p1·oviBo ''
in certain particular relations may be given a different meaning. But the entire discussion is limited to that particular word-does not once mention the words ''Bubo
conditione," or name a single instance where they are nserl in a sense contrary to the
general rule, aud even in respect to the word '' p1·oviBo" the exception could not
apply to the case under consideration, for it is expressly limited to a use of the word
where it does not stand "originally, by and of itself."
The other authorities to which we have been referred are not in any sense repugnant, to the view of the law we adopt. They are few in numbers, and at the best
simply bold that these apt words may, in certain instances, be restricted by immediate reference to other portions of the deed clearly expressing a different intent in
the grantor. 'l'bat this is true is not denied; but it does not change the general rule,
and its applicability to the case under consideration will more properly be noticed
hereafter.
We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that section o of the act, by the express
language used, created an estate upon condition subsequent, forfeitable upon breach
of the condition.

II.

Section 9 of the act, while perhaps embracing the preceding section within its provisions, and possibly to that extent cumulative, is also a provision prescribing certain other and additional conditions subiequent.
It will be noticed at the. outset that by its specific language it embraces mort\ than
one grant, the exact words being "the sereral conditioned g1·ants herein" and that it relates to a" further" condition. The ''further" condition was that if the company
should make any breach of" the conditions hereof" and the same should continue for
a year, then the United States might, &c. Now, it is obvious upon the mere reading
that this language does not primarily relate to section 8, for that section only appertains to one grant, needs no "further" condition, and the provision that the default.
should continue for a year or upwards would have no pertinence. This section evidently relates t.o some other condition or conditions than that mentioned in section 8.
These other conditions or requirements are found 'i n section 5, which provides that
six separate and distinct things should be done by the company, viz : 1st, that theroad should be constructed in a substantial and workmanlike manner, equal in all
respects to first-class railroad; 2d, that it should be made of rails of the best quality,.
manufactured from American iron; 3d, that a uniform gauge should be established

·..,

FORFEITED LAND GRA.t,·Ts.

9

throughoui! the entire line; 4th, that the company should construct a telegraph line
of the most approved and substantial description; 5th, that it should not charge the
Government higher rates than individuals; and 6th, that it should permit other railroads to make runmng connections on fair and reasonable terms. These are the other
and further conditions mentioned by section 9, in default of any of which, continuing
for a year, Congress should have the right to "do any and all acts and things" to
secure the "speedy completion of the said road," as contemplated and provided.
The intent of Congress, expressed with abundant precision in the act itself, and, as
every one knows, as a matter of history, was to insure the construction, within the
time prescribed, of a substantial, first-class, and thoroughly equipped railroad from
Lake Superior to the Pacific, suitable and available in all emergencies for use by the
United States-in peace for the transmission of its mails; in war for the carrying of
troops and supplies. Congress did not donate 48,000,000 acres of the public domain
to this company without expecting and requiring some equivalent. Among the
things it did require was the construction of a first-class road for the purposes and in
the manner indicated. It accordingly prescribed the various requirements above recited, and to insure obedience to its mandates it provided by section 9 that in default
of any of the same Congress might do anything necessary to complete the road in the
manner contemplated and prescribed. The enactment of these provisions would have
been futile had no reservation been made of a right to enforce them. Without such
a reservation the Government, upon default of the company, would have had nothing
left except a claim against the company for breach of contract or of covenant. To
prevent such a condition of affairs the right was reserved to further legislate to compel obedience to its mandates. These requirements then became additional conditions subsequent, which Congress could enforce by forfeiture or by any other remedy
deemed appropriate and adequate. That was the object, scope, and intent of section
9, and it is expressed in unambiguous phrase.
It is no answer to this proposition to say t.hat these requirements might be enforced
by the general forfeiture provided by section 8.
The road might have been built within the time limited and yet every one of these
conditions been broken. The grant conld not then have been forfeited at all under
section 8. A road would have been completed, and though built iu absolute disregard of all the requirements of section 5, the Government would have been powerless
either to resume the grant or compel the company to perform the condition. That
section 9 relates to other conditions than that mentioned in section 8 is also apparent
from the use of the words "and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year."
These words, if applied to the conditions mentioned in section 5, mean something. If
applied to section 8 they are nonsensical. If Congress had intended to extend the
period mentioned in section 8 one year, it would have said July 4, 1877; not July 4,
1876, and another year thereafter.
It is thus apparent that section 9 of the act has a scope and effect far beyond any:thing embraced by section 8; that it legislated upon further and additional subjects;
has a separate and distinct function of its own, and that instead of limiting or controlling the preceding section it creates additional obligations and liability on the
part of the company.
The only answer to this position advanced by the company is the suggestion that if
this be true then the two sections are utterly inconsistent with each other. It is difficult to understand how this can be seriously urged. We have already shown a dif- ferent legal scope and operation for each under the construction we have adopted.
'l'hey are not repugnant or inconsistent in the slightest degree. Each stands for its own
particular purpose. On the other hand, the construction contended for by the company would violate well-established rules of construction simply to disregard the
plainly expressed intent of Congress. They claim that the two sections should be
taken together, and that so taken all that Congress could do upon failure of the company to build the road would be to take all necessary steps to compel its completion
without power to forfeit the grant.
This position is untenable under the rules of construction because, first, it assumes
an ambiguity, and then to reconcile it rejects the usual and ordinary signification of
terms and phrases; twice reads as singular a word in the plural, and construes ''further
condition" as if the word'' further" was omitted; second, with reference to a simple
time condition, viz, that the road should be built by July 4, 1876, it adds the senseless
expression, "provided the same shall continue unbuilt one year"; third, it excludes all
of section 3 from itA relations and connections with section 9 and either rejects it entirely or make3 it practically inoperative; fourth, it violates the manifest general
intent of the entire act and the general policy of Congress prevailing at the time in
respect to these grants.
Another consideration is to be noticed. The provision of section 9 is permissive
or directory only. Congress may do all necessary things, &c. It is not mandatory
as it would have been if intended as the sole remedy for the breach of the condition
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of section 8. So too His not exclusive of other remedies for the breach. Congress
may in that way enforce the forfeiture or may do it otherwise.
We have been referred to some authorities which are supposed to sustain the forced
construction of the act contended for, but after the most careful examination of
them we are unable to recognize any doctrine contrary to that we have adopted
for our guidance. The strongest cited are undoubtedly the cases of the Episcopal
Mission vB. Appleton etal. (17 Mass., 326), and Stanley VB. Colt (5 Wall., 119). They
do not establish any new doctrine or any principle repugnant to the authority of the
l()ng line of cases we have cited.
In the former, the supreme court of Massachusetts, speaking of a voluntary deed
for charitable purposes, say:
''Although the words 'upon condition' in a conveyance of real estate are apt words
to create a condition, any breach of which will forfeit the estate, yet they are not to
be allowed that effect when the intention of the grantor, as manifested by the whole
deed, is otherwise."
And in the latter, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking of a devise for
certain charitable purposes, say:
"It is true the word 'proviso' is an appropriate one to constitute a common-law condition in a deed or will; but this is not t.he fixed and invariable meaning attached to
it by the law in these instruments. On the contrary, it gives way to the intent of the
parties as gathered from an examination of the whole instrument," &c.
The principle announced by these decisions is simply the universal rule of construction giving effect to the real intent of the parties to an instrument when the same can
be fairly ascertained from the language used. In other words, that technical expressions and phrases ordinarily yield to a contrary plainly expressed intent. But the
principle has no applicability to the case under consideration, for there is no intent,
either expressed or to be reasonably implied, contrary to the technical meaning of the
words, "upon condition." On the contrary, the act from be~inning to end displays
in every line a most deliberate, well considered, and matured mtention not to bestow
this princely gift without AO circumscribing and limiting the company by these conditions as to secure the object, and every object, which Congress had in view. It
shows the clearest intention in the mind of Congress to create a condition subsequent
forfeiting the grant for failure to build the road within the prescribed period; and
also other conditions subsequent, putting it in the power of Congress, even after the
road had been built, to enforce the requirements of the act touching the manner of
its construction. In the judgment of your committee, there- is not a word in the act
indicative of an intent to limit or curtail the technical words of condition used.
And aside from the language of the act itself, it is incredible that CongresR could
have intended, in this probably the largest and most valuable grant of lands ever
made to a railroad company or a State, to depart from the uniform and uninterrupted policy of legislation for years, and allow the company to appropria,te this vast
belt of the public domain without restriction, reservation, or control. Your committee cannot subscribe to such a doctrine and can find no argument, even plausible, to
support it. We are clearly of opinion that Congress intended to provide for a forfeiture upon failure to build the road within the prescribed period, and that the language
used was abundantly sufficient in law to accomplish that intent.

III.
Your committee are also well satisfied that even under section 9 of the act, in the
sense in which it is construed by the company, Congress had and has the power to
declare a forfeiture. It is conceded that under it ·Congress can do any and all acts
and things needful and necessary to insure a speedy completion of the road. Congress
is the sole and exclusive judge of whether the road has at any time, in point of fact,
been completed; and if not, what remedy should be applied. The remedy of forfeiture
is included within the general power reserved. The road is in fact uncompleted to
this day. Congress can now, by virtue of that very reservation, so strenuously insisted upon by the company as protecting the grant, declare the same forfeited and
restored to the public domain. Might not the forfeiture of the grant in the hands of
this company and the consequent creation of an open field for equal competition best
conduce to the speedy ultimate completion of the entire line' If Congress so view
the matter, there can be no doubt of its power to declare the forfeiture under the
very clause of the act relied upon by the company for its protection.
OTHER OBJECTIONS URGED .AGAINST THE FORFEITURE CONSIDERED.

The granting act was silent upon the authority of the company to
mortgage its grant. And it is insisted that doubts were entertained
among capitalists as to whether the company could make a mortgage
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without this authority was expressed by Congress, and this greatly embarrassed and prevented the utilization of the grant to raise money for
the construction of the road. Hence, the company urged Congress to
pass an act on April20, 1871 (Stat., vol. 17, p. 19) granting express authority to the company to so mortgage. And after asking and getting
this act passed, which was said to be so necessary to aid the company
in raising money to build the road, it is now insisted that it presents an
additional reason that it was intended by Congress to create a trust
fund to build this road with conditions that if the company did not apply the fund to the prescribed use within a specified time, or if the
mortgagees of the said company did not so apply the same within another specified time that then the Government might take any and all
steps to secure its intended application, so far as it had not previously
been applied.
This is a strange construction to be placed upon the act. Not a single
authority is cited by the able coun~el for the company in support of it;
and we venture to assert none can be found in any respectable law
book in the land. No trust is created, either express or implied, in the
act; no trustee is named or provided for, for none exists, and we will not,
therefore, waste time in producing argument and citing authorities
against this misconstruction.
After giving the express right to mortgage, the act of April20, 1871,
above referred to, contains the following proviso:
Provided, That if the company shall hereafter suffer any breach of the conditions
of the act above referred to, under which it is organized, the rights of those claiming
under any mortgage made by the company to the lands sranted to it by said act shall
extend only to so much thereof as shall be coterminous w1th or appertain to that part
of said road which shall have been constructed at the time of the fOJ·ecloBure of Baid
mortgage.

The attorneys for the trustees of the bondholders under the first
mortgage made by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad ·Company assume:
1st. That· this proviso is equivalent to a declaration that on default
made by the company in complying with any of the conditions of the
grant, the mortgagees should have the right to all the lands embraced
in the grant which were coterminous with the completed road at the
time of foreclosure.
If this construction is the correct one, and, as we have shown, the
mortgageors and mortgagees are the Saint Louis and San Francisco and
the Atchison, Topeka aud Santa Fe Hailroad Uompanies, and that these
two companies have constructed and are operating and controlling all
the road which bas been completed (except the 34 miles), then they
have complete control of the grant. They can hold it for a hundred
years without completing another mile of the road, and the Government
can do nothing, no matter how many breaches of the contract may be
committed.
We do not agree with the learned counsel in this construction of the
proviso. If they are correct why should Congress say "that if the
company suffer any breach of the conditions of the act" under which it
was organized the rights of those claiming under al,!y mortgage made
by the company should extend only to the lands coterminous with completed road¥ Why not have said that the right of those claiming under
any mortgage made by the company to the lands granted to it by said
act shall extend only to so much thereof as is coterminous with the completed road at the time of the foreclosure of said mortgage¥
If .this language had been used and none other the construction con-
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tended for would be correct. But this language was substantially used
and also the other language set forth in the proviso, which destroys the
construction placed upon it by the attorneys of the mortgagees; and
which, in the opinion of your committee, clearly shows that it was the
legislative intent to limit the rights of the mortgagees to the lands coterminous with the completed road at the date of the breach of conditions
set forth in the original act, and not at the date of the foreclosure of
the mortgage. This we think is the clear legal expression of the act .
.Any other construction would destroy the effect of one-half of the language in the proviso by treating it as surplusage. This cannot be done
here without violating the rules of construction and thereby doing great
injustice to the Government.
If the constrilction thus placed upon this proviso be correct Congress
bas the right to forfeit all the lands gra,nted without regard to the
mortgage, for it was executed after breach of the conditions subsequent
had occurred. The mortgagPes acquired no rights ut~der the mortgage
which could preYent Congress from declaring a forfeiture. They knew
of the breach and took their chances.
But it is further insisted that this act of Congress last referred to
authorized the company to execute a mortgage on its property and
franchisPs, and issue bonds, and is therefore in the nature of a waiver
or bar to the power of Congress to do any act by which the interests of
the mortgagees may be affected detrimentally.
This position is not tenable. Congress, by the passage of said act,
did not authorize the company to mortg-age the unconditional fee;
but, upon the contrary, expTessly reserved all the conditions expressed
in the original act. The compauy did not own the unconditional fee
in the lands granted. It owned the fee charged with the conditions
subsequent, and it could mortgage and the mortgagees could only
take under the mortgage such estate as the company owned at the
time the mortgage was executed.
The mortgagees must be held to have known that they were taking
an estate which was defeasible upon condition broken. They stand in
the place of the mortgageor. There being a breach of the conditions
subsequent by the failure of the company to complete its road within
the time fixed by the grant the mortgagees must take whatever consequences a forfeiture imposes, which is the loss of the defeasible estate
in so much of the lands granted by the third section of the granting
act as the bill accompanying this report provides for. They will still retain if the bill passes their lien on the right of way, &c., granted by the
second section of said act.
That we are right in these conclusions we think the authorities abundantly show. In Kent (vol. 4, p. 125) the rule is laid down as follows:
Persons who have an estate or freehold subject to a condition are seized and may
convey, though the estate will continue defeasible until the condition be performed
or released, or is barred by the statute of limitation, or by estoppel.

Greenleaf's Cruise on Real Property (vol. 2, pp. 44, 52) thus lays
down the doctrine:
Where a person enters for a condition broken the estate becomes void ab initio; the
person who enters is again seized of his original estate in the same 'manner as ~f he had never
conveyed it away. And as the entry of the feoffer on the feoffee for a condition broken
defeats the estate to which the condition was annexed, so it defeats all rights and incidents annexed to that estate, together with all charges and encumbrances created by the feoffee
during his possession; for upon the entry of the fooffer he beoonl.es seized of an e1fate paramount to that which was subject to these charges.
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Washburn on Real Property is to the same effect (vol. 2, p. 11, [marginal page 45]):
When such entry had been made the effect was to reduce the estate to the same
plight, and to cause it to be held in the same terms as if the estate to which the condition was annexed had not been granted.
QUESTION OF TIME MORE FULLY CONSIDERED.

Tbe time within which a condition subsequent is to be performed is,
in tllis case, as mncll the essence of tlle coutract as any other part or requirement of the condition. Not even equity will relieve against failure
to perform witllin the time allowe(l a condition subsequent. Especially
is this so when the time for the performance of tlle condition is fixed
by statute, as in this case. (In Farnesworth vs. M. and P. R. R. Co., 2
Otto, 49; 2 Story, Equity Juris., 103; 26 Willard's Equity Juris., 1324;
3 Washburn on Real Property, 17, m. p. 455.) Nor where parties have
fixed the time of performing the contract, unless sometimes in case of
sale of laud for money and damages for delay is mere matter of computation of interest. (Boardman vs. Imrick, 10 Cal., 96; 2 White &
Tudor's Leading Oases in Eq ., 1105; 2 Jones on Mortgages, 1185; 2 Washburn on Real Property, 17.) The grant being oue in presenti with condition subsequent, on failure to perform the condition within the time
stipulated the right to declare a forfeiture became perfect. A condition not performed within the specified time when time is a part of the
condition can never be performed.
A railroad to be built by the 4th day of July, 1878, cannot after
that date be built within that time.
Time in this case was of the essence of the condition:
(1.) Because it was expressly stipulated;
(2.) Because it was fixed by statute;
(3.) Because the value of the land would increase by lapse of time; and,
(4.) Because the object of the grant was to promote the early development of an unsettled portion of the country. Any one of these is
sufficient to make time the essence of the conditions subsequent. (See
Pumroy on Contracts, sees. 383, 384, 385, 386.)
The withdrawal of a large body of land, amounting to many millions
of acres, from market and settlement without the building of the road,
retards, instead of promotes, the development of the country, and therefore defeats the very object of the grant. Congress does not make grants
to aid in the construction of a road in portions of the country already well
settled, nor does it authorize lands to be withdrawn from market and
held in reservation or in trust to be given as a reward for the construction of a road after the country is well settled, for in thickly settled regions railroads will be built without Government aid.
We have already shown by authorities cited that when time of performance is fixed in the instrument, or by statute, or is of the essence
of the condition, or compensation for breach cannot be made-and all
these elements are contained in this condition-it must be strictly performed, whether it is a condition precedent or subsequent.
(1. Broom and Hadley's Com., 602 (Waits's ed.), Note 277; 2. Redfield
on Wills, 286, note; Taylor's Landlord and Tenant, p. 240, sec. 282;
1. Bouvier's Institutes, 759, 760; Tyler on Ejectments, 179.)
A forfeiture for breach of condition may be waived. But a waiver
be implied by silence. (B. and M. R. R. Co. -os. Boestler, 15 Iowa,
; Jackson va. Brock, 1 Johnson's Cases, 125; Lawrence vs. Gifford,
Pick., 366; Pike vs. Butler, 4 N. Y., 360.)
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Nor is a forfeiture waived by delay in enforcing it. (Gray vs. Blanchard, 8 Pick., 284; Pery vs. Davis, 3 C. B. (N. S.), 769; Doe vs. Allen,
3 Taunt, 78; Calderwood vs. Brooks, 28 Cal., 15 J .)
It must be remembered that the will or intent of Congress can never
be implied from silence. It must always be ascertained from enactments and resolutions. No waiver of forfeiture can be presumed by
Congress, unle~s such waiver is made by statute or resolution, either
expressly, or by fair implication from the provisions expressed.
In construing public grants, all doubts which exist are to be resolved
in favor of the Government and against the grantee.
OBLIGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO INDIAN TITLE,

It is asserted by the attorneys of the company that the Government
obligated itself, by the granting act, to extinguish the Indian· title and
survey the lands in the Indian Territory ; and they claim that both were
indispensable to the complete utilization of the grant by its beneficiary.
The realization of aid from the grants pledged by Congress to secure the
construction of the road, and the possibility of reimbursement by profit.
able carrying-trade in the operation of a constructed road, were necessarily dependent upon the promised change in the legal conditions of
the land titles along the prescribed route of the proposed road. They
insist that the United States has not even attempted to fulfill its promise to extinguish the Indian titles.
,.
All this is insisted upon with a pretended belief that it is based upon
a fair construction of the granting act. The general route of the road,
as prescribed by this act, runs from the west line of the State of Missouri for three hundred and fifty miles through the Indian Territory,
which was prior to said grant set apart by the Government for the benefit of the Indians. The ultimate fee is vested in the United States,
but which, by treaty stipulations, statutory enactments, and e.xecutive
acts thereunder, have been set apart and reserved for the sole use and
occupancy of certain Indian nations and tribes so long as their national
or tribal organizations are preserved. The boundaries of this section of
country are defined by various treaties with these nations and tribes,
and by legislative acts which prescribe the limits of the contiguous
States and Territories of the Union. The public-land system has never
been extended over it. Congress has never taken any action to have it
surveyed as public land. Much of it is held by four nations, the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, and Creek, who have patents in accordance
with treaties and laws, and all attempts to induce Congress to organize it into a Territory of the United States have, up to this time, failed.
This is enough to show that the company bas no grant of land in this
Territory, neither present norprospective, in our opinion. Nonewas intended to be conferred by the act, except as such grant might be acquired from the Indians by said company. Let us examine the granting act for a moment.
The pretended claim of the company for the survey of the lands in
this Territory is based upon the fourth and sixth sections of the act.
If these sections stood alone and could be considered by themselves, or
in connection with only the last clause of the second section; if there
were no limitations to the grant as made by the third section, and if the
seventeenth section was no part of the law, there might be some plausibility in the claim that the fourth and sixth sections required that the
lands be surveyed as fast as the road was completed. But if we consider the law as a whole, as enacted, the claim is without foundation.
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Under the third section the land to pass under the grant must be public land, situated in a Territory or State, the title of which is in the
United States, and which has not been sold or otherwise appropriated
at the time the map of location of the route of its road is filed in the
General Land Office.
The lands in the Indian Territory are not public lands in the usual
meaning of that term, and are not situated in a State or Territory of
the United States. Certainly the United States so far as the lands
within the boundaries of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek,
and Seminole Nations are concerned, does not possess full title to them;
for they were, prior to the year 1866, the date of the granting act, set
apart and reserved by the United States for the sole use and occupancy
of various Indian nations and tribes. Therefore the claim that these
lands were included in the grant under the third section cannot be
maintained.
Your committee is of the opinion, after a careful examination of the
whole act, that no land was granted to the company in the Indian Territory except such as might be acquired by the company from the Indian·s
by virtue of the seventeenth section. This section authorized the company to accept any grant from an Indian tribe or nation through whose
reservation its road might pass, subject to the approval of the President
of the United States. This is the privilege conferred by the act, and
we believe that the last clause of the second section only becomes
applicable when this is done:
And "the United States shall extinguish, as rapidly as may be consistent with public policy and the welfare of the Indians, and only by their voluntary cession, the
Indian title to all lands falling under the operation of this act and acquired in the
donation to the road named in the act."

The company at the beginning acted upon this construction of the
law. This is fully shown by the files of the Interior Department.
It asked permission of the Interior Department, and leave was granted,
to open negotiations with some Qf the Indian tribes to effect a grant of
lands, but was not successful in its efforts with the Indians. Thus the
company by its acts admitted that there were no lands granted to it other
than the right of way which was provided for in the treaties between
the Government and the Indians.
The company never set up any claim that it received any land by
the grant in the Indian Territory until in the year 1877-eleven years
after the act was passed.
The Interior Department holds that· no lands were granted to this
company in the Iudian Territory. This has been the uniform ruling of
that Department on the subject. It was the ruling of the Hon. J. A.
Williamson wbile he was Commissioner of the General Land Office,
who is now attorney for the company.
Your committee therefore finds that there is nothing in the claim of
the attorneys of the company that the Government has failed in extinguishing the Indian titles and surveying the lands in the Indian
Territory, as no grant of land was made to the company in said Territory.
E~llf~ E ~·.~ . ·
We therefore, in view of the law and facts set forth in this report,
recommend the passage of the accompanying bill as a substitute for
all bills introduced in the House for the forfeiture of the land grant
made to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company. _..,.__ ;;;;...
....E ..
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A BILL to forfeit the unearned lands granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company " to aid
in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the States of Missouri and Arkansas to
the Pacific coast," and to restore the same to settlement, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Anterica
in Congress asRentbled, That all the lands, excepting the right of way and lands for
stations, heretofore granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company by an act
entitled "An act granting lands to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph
line from the States of Missouri and Arkansas to the Pacific coast," approved July
twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, and subsequent acts and joint resolutions of Congress, which are adjacent to and coterminous with the uncompleted
poortions of the main line of said road, embraced within both the granted and indemnity limits, as contemplated to be constructed under and by the provisions of the said
act of July twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, and acts and joint resolutions subsequent thereto and relating to the construction of said road and telegraph,
be, and the same are hereby, declared forfeited and restored to the public domain,
and made subject to disposal under the general laws of the United States, as though
said grant had never been made: Provided, That the price of the lands so forfeited
and restored shall be the same as heretofo.Ie fixed for the even-numbered section within
said grant.
SEc. 2. That the act of March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-five, entitled" An
act for the relief of settlers within railroad limits," is hereby repealed.
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